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The insanity defense has long been controversial, and
thus it is not surprising that efforts to "reform" the defense periodically surface. The acquittal of JOhn Hinckley
has spawned another period of reexamination. United
States v. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D. D.C. June 21,
1982). The American Psychiatric Association, the National Commission on the Insanity Defense, and the American Bar Association have all taken positions on the issue.
Moreover, legislatures have responded with a number of
statutory revisions. This article surveys these "reform"
efforts, as well as several related evidentiary issues. In
addition, diminished capacity and competency to stand
trial are examined.
At the outset, it seems helpful to acknowledge the public perception of the insanity defense because that perception undoubtedly influences the legislative response.
One commentator, citing the findings of the National
Commission on the Insanity Defense, wrote:
The commission report found that the public's perceptions
of the insanity defense are largely formed by selective news
reporting, and it sought to separate the myth from the reality.
For example, the Commission discovered that, contrary to
public perceptions, the insanity defense is rarely used and is
infrequently successful. It noted, too, that the public believes
"most insanity defendants are murderers who commit random acts of violence," although in reality. most insanity defendants are charged with committing nonviolent crimes.
Further, most acquittees are confined for long periods of
time. The Commission also found that the well-publicized
case is the exception, not the rule. In fact, "[m)ost insanity
cases relfect agreement among the experts, the defense,
and the prosecution." Few go to trial and even fewer go to a
jury. Wexler, Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 528, 537-38 (1985), citing National Mental Health
Association, Myths and Realities: A Report of the National
Commission on the Insanity Defense (1983).

INSANITY TESTS
Insanity raises a legal, not medical, issue: whether a
defendant, due to his mental condition, should be held
criminally responsible for his conduct. Various legal tests
have been used to define insanity.
Under the M'Naghten rule (1843), sometimes known
as the "right-wrong" test, insanity exists if:

[A]t the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep.
718, 722 (1843).

Many jurisdictions supplemented the M'Naghten test,
which focuses on cognition, with a volitional or control
test. This test exonerates a defendant who, due to his
mental condition, cannot control his conduct even
though he knew what he was doing and knew it was
wrong. This test is often referred to as the "irresistible
impulse" test. That term, however, is misleading because
it suggests that a sudden impulse is required, which is
usually not the case. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law
284 (1972)("[1]n practice the test is broader than the misleading 'irresistible impulse' language suggests, for the
jury is not ordinarily told that the defendant must have
acted upon a sudden impulse or that his acts must have
been totall¥ irresistible.").
Durham Test
The M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests represented the principal tests for insanity until the 1950s. In
that decade two noteworthy changes were proposed. In
1954, the famous Durham decision, rejected both
M'Naghten and its volitional supplement and in their
place substituted a "product test." Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). According to the
D.C. CircJ.Jit, an "accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect." /d. at 874-75. After numerous attempts to
clarify the Durham rule, the D.C. Circuit overruled Durham in 1972. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). See generally Symposium, United States v.
Brawner, 1973 Wash. U.L.O. 17-154.
Model Penal Code Test
Soon after the Durham case had been decided, the
drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) proposed a different insanity test: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
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conduct orto conform his conduct to the requirements of
1aW.·'N1&8~1l't;r18TcaCfe·§·4:o1 (Propos-ed official Draft
1962). The MPGtest can be described as a "modernized
versipn~9f theM'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests."
W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 292 (1972). Although
the MPC test contains the cognitive and volitional prongs
of the earlier tests, both prongs are modified by the term
"substantial." Thus, unlike the earlier tests, complete
. cognitive incapacity or complete lack of control is not re. qui red under the MPC test. The MPC test eventually became the majority rule in this country. See P. Low, J.
Jeffries & R. Bonnie, Criminal Law 659 (1982) ("The Model Penal Code testhas been adopted ... in more than
half of the states; it is also used in the federal courts.").

supra, at 7-262 ("This issue of basic fairness may be of
constitutional dimension."). Nevertheless, the Montana
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
Montana statute. State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont.
1984) ..

Burden of Proof
Traditionally, the initial burden of production or going
forward with evidence of insanity has been placed on the
defendant, either because insanity was explicitly recognized as an affirmative defense or because of the presumption of sanity. The burden of persuasion, however,
was differen~. Some jurisdictions placed this burden on
the defendant, while others placed it on the prosecution.
In 1972 a leading text could make the following statement: "In about half of the states and the federal government, this burden rests with prosecution; in these-jurisdictions the prosecution must then proceed to prove responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt." W. LaFave & A.
Scott, Criminal Law 313 (1972).

Nevertheless, the MPC test, like the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests, was the subject of criticism. Dissatisfaction with the insanity defense remained. See
Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis
of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 527, 640A5
(1978). The successful use of the insanity defense by
John Hinckley in his trial for the attempted assassination
of President Reagan increased this dissatisfaction.
Consequently, several changes in the insanity defense
have been proposed or adopted. Some of the proposed
changes, such as the guilty but mentally ill verdict, predated the Hinckley decision.

Recent statutory changes have altered this picture.
They restrict the insanity defense by allocating the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. In some jurisdictions, the standard of proof placed on the defendant is a
preponderance of evidence. E.g. Ind. Code Ann.§
35-41-4-1(b) (West Supp. 1985); Iowa Code Ann.§ 701.4
(West Supp. 1985); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 315(a)
(Purdon 1983). Other jurisdictions require the defendant
to establish insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 20 (b) (West Supp. 1985); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-502(B) (Supp. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann.§ 22-5-10 (Supp. 1985).

Abolition
A few jurisdictions have abolished the insanity defense. E.g., Idaho Code§ 18-207 (Supp. 1985); Mont.
Code Ann.§ 46-14-102 (1985); Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-305(1)(Supp. 1985).1"hese statutes permit evidence
of mental abnormality only to negate the mens rea of the
char.ged.offense. For-example, the Montana statute proviaes: ''Evidence of mental disease or defect is not admissible in atrialon the_meritsJJD!f:!sS the defendant ...
files a written notice of his purpose to rely on a mental
disease or defect to prove that he did not have a particular state of mind which is an essential element of the offense charged." Mont. Code. Ann.§ 46-14-102 (1983).
See generally Comment, After Abolition: The Present
State of the Insanity Defense in Montana, 45 Mont. L.
Rev. 133 (1984).

The constitutionality of allocating to the defense the
burden of persuasion on insanity has been upheld by the
Supreme Court. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
(1952), the Court upheld a state rule allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Nevertheless, the
Court's later decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975), although not involving the insanity defense, cast
some doubt on the continued vitality of Leland. However,
when the Court was presented with the insanity issue in
a subsequent case, it dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question, a disposition which is accorded precedential weight. Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (Del. 1976),
appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). See also Krzeminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
866 (1980); C. McCormick, Evidence 990 (3d ed. 1984).
If, however, insanity is treated under state law as an element of a· crime, due process precludes the state from allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Duffy
v. Foltz, 772 F.2d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[W]e conclude that ... sanity [under Michigan law] was an element of the crime tor federal due process purposes.").

The ABA Mental Health Standards reject the abolitionist position on policy grounds:
Questions regarding the defense are moral rather than
scientific questions .... To label as criminals those so severely disturbedthat they.could not appreciate the wrongfulnessof their acts offends the moral tenets of the criminal law
and the moral intuitions of the community. This approach
would mean that judges and juries would be forced either to
return convictions which would be morally obtuse or to
acquit in outright defiance of the law. The abolitionist
approach ... would prevent the exercise of humane moral
judgement- and it is that exercise which has distinguished
our criminal law heritage. ABA, Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards 7-263 to -264 (1st Tent. Draft 1983).

Rejection of the Volitional Test
Another recent change involves the rejection of the
volitional or irresistible impulse prong of the insanity defense. For example, the ABA Mental Health Standards
provide that a person "is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such conduct, and as a result of
mental disease or detect, that person was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of such conduct." ABA Standard 7-6.1 (1984). This test does not recognize lack of
control as a defense. The principal argument for this

For a discussion of the policy issues involved in the abolition of the insanity defense, compare N. Morris, Madness
and the Criminal Law (1982) (favoring abolition), with
Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777 (1985) (favoring retention).
The commentary to the ABA Standards also questioned the constitutionality of abolition. ABA Standards,
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change is the lack of a
scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for selfcontrol or for calibrating the impairment of that capacity.
There is, in short, no objective basis for distinguishing
between offenders who were undeterrable and those who
were merely undeterred, between the impulse that was
irresistible and the impulse not resisted, or between
substantial impairment of capacity and some lesser impairment. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69
A.B.A.J. 194, 196 (1983).

substantial decrease in the number of NGRI acquittals.
One study reported: "An empirical analysis of the GBMI
verdict indicates that the verdict is not functioning as
expected. The NGRI verdict continues to be used in
Michigan courts." Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty
But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. Mich.
J.L. Ref. 77, 104 (1982). This study also found that "most
defendants found GBMI would probably have received
guilty verdicts in the absence of the GBMI statute" and
"although the verdict was designed for jury trials, over
60% of those defendants found GBMI have come
through plea-bargains and another 20% have come from
bench trials." /d. Another commentator has stated:

This position is supported by the American Psychiatric
Association, which concluded that the "line between an
irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk."
American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 681, 685 (1983).
The Fifth Circuit adopted the ABA approach soon after it
was proposed. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243,
248-49 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 323 (1984).
In October 1984, Congress enacted the first federal insanity statute. This statute provides:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate
the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. 18
U.S.C.A. § 20(a) (West Supp. 1985).
Like the ABA test, the federal test eliminates the volitional prong of the insanity defense; thus, whether or not a
defendant can control his conduct is no longer relevant.
The federal statute does, however, differ from the ABA
proposal in one important respect. Under the ABA proposal, once insanity is raised the prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant sane beyond a reasonable
doubt. ABA Standard 7-6.9 (1984). Under the federal statute, the defendant has the burden of proving insanity by
clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 20(b) (West
Supp. 1985).
·
Similarly, California has returned to the M'Naghten
rule. For over a century California followed this rule. In
1978, however, the California Supreme Court adopted the
MPC test. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318,
149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). In 1982 the voters adopted an
initiative measure, known as Proposition 8, which established a statutory definition of insanity. Cal. Penal Code§
25(b) (West 1986). This provision reinstated the M'Naghten rule. See People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 704 P.2d
752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985).

The guilty but mentally [ill] verdict does not seem to be
achieving its intended goals. It has not substantially reduced
insanity acquittals nor enhanced public safety. It has not
appreciably improved treatment for mentally ill offenders
and has failed to affect expert involvement in criminal adjudications ....
At the same time, guilty but mentally ill legislation has
injected a misleading and confusing element into criminal
adjudications .... Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill
Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 494, 517 (1985).
See also McGraw, Farthing-Capowich & Keilitz, The
"Guilty But Mentally Ill" Plea and Verdict: Current State of
the Knowledge, 30 Viii. L. Rev. 117 (1985); Britton & Bennett, Adopt Guilty But Mentally Ill?- No!, 15 U. Tol. L.
Rev. 203 (1983); Fentiman, "Guilty But Mentally Ill": The
Real Verdict Is Guilty, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 601 (1985); Stelzner
& Piatt, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Plea in New
Mexico, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 99 (1983); Note, Criminal Responsibility: Changes in the Insanity Defense and the "Guilty
But Mentally Ill" Response, 21 Washburn L.J. 515 (1982);
Note, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and Due Process,
92 Yale L.J. 475 (1983).
Constitutional chall,enges to GBMIIegislation have
been unsuccessful. See Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska App. 1985); Keener v. State, 254 Ga. 699, 334 S.E.2d
175 (1985); People v. Ramsey, 422 Mich. 500, 375 N.W.2d
297 (1985).
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Expert Testimony
In some cases the qualifications of an expert to testify
in support of an insanity defense has been an issue. For
example, in Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), the trial court held that a psychologist was not
competent to give an opinion concerning a mental disease or defect, apparently on the grounds that psychologists lack medical training. The D.C. Circuit reversed.
According to the court, many psychologists, due to their
training and experience, would not be qualified to testify
concerning a mental disease or defect. Other psychologists, however, have extensive training and experience in
the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders and
would therefore be qualified. Thus, it is not the title of
"psychologist" that is determinative but rather the nature
and extent of the individual psychologist's knowledge. /d.
at 644-45.

Guilty But Mentally Ill
Another "reform" effort involves the adoption of a
"guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI) verdict. This verdict is an
alternative to a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI)
verdict; it does not replace the NGRI verdict. E.g., Alaska
Stat.§ 12.47.030 (Supp. 1985); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §
408 (Supp. 1984); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131 (Supp. 1985);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § 115-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985);
Ind. Code Ann.§§ 35-36-2-3 (West Supp. 1985); Ky. Rev.
Stat.§ 504.120 (Supp. 1984); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§
768.36 (1982); N.M. Stat. Ann.§§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4 (1984); 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 314 (Purdon 1983); S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. § 23A-7-2 (Supp. 1985).
In 1975 Michigan was the first state to adopt this verdict. Studies of the GBMI verdict indicate that this verdict
has not had the effect its proponents anticipated, i.e., a

The ABA Standards go beyond the traditional qualification rules and require more stringent standards, including minimum clinical educational and training re-
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quirements. ABAStandard 7c3.11(a) (1984). In addition,
an expert is not permitted to testify concerning a person's
mental condtion unless he has conducted a thorough
evaluation, including a personal interview. ABA Standard
7-3.11(a) (3) (1984).
See generally Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental
Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case
for Informed Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427 (1980); Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness:
Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 Mich. L. Rev.
1335 (1965); Morris, Mental Health Professionals in the
Criminal Justice Process: The A.B.A. Standards, 21 Grim.
L. BUll. 321 (1985); Wells, The 1984 A.B.A. Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards and the Expert Witness:
New Therapy for a Troubled Relationship?, 13 W. St. U.L.
Rev. 79 (1985).

even though not amounting to insanity, precluded him
from having the mental state required by the charged
offense. In other words, his mental condition negates the
requisite mens rea. The ABA Standards recognize the
admissibility of such evidence: "Evidence, including expert testimony, concerning the defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged offense which tends to
show the defendant did or did not have the mental state
required for the offense charged should be admissible."
ABA Standard 7-6.2 (1984). Similarly, the Model Penal
Code § 4.02(1) provides: "Evidence that the defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible
whenever it is re[gy_ant to prove that the defendant did or
did not have a state of mind that is an element of the
offense."
This issue is sometimes called "diminished capacity"
or "partial responsibility." One commentator summarized
the argument for this defense as follows:

Ultimate Issue Rule
Another evidentiary issue that has caused difficulty is
the so-called "ultimate issue" rule. In other words, may
an expert testify that the defendant was insane or knew
the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense? Such an opinion might be excluded because it
involves an "ultimate issue" in the case. For example,
Federal Evidence Rule704(b) provides:
-.i.L.
,,l'c

j

· .•::
1

I

!,,

The logic of the partial responsibility doctrine would seem to
be unassailable. The reception of evidence of the -defendant's abnormal mental condition, totally apart from the
defense of insanity, is certainly appropriate whenever that
evidence is relevant to the issue of whether he had the mental state which is a necessary element of the crime charged.
Were it otherwise, major crimes specifically requiring a certain bad state of mind would, in effect, be strict liability offenses as applied to abnormal defendants. W. LaFave & A.
Scott, Criminal Law 331 (1972).

No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state
or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an
opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.

The mens rea defense differs from insanity in anumber of ways. If an insanity defense is successful, the result is a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (although commitment is typical). A successful mens rea
defense results in an acquittal of the charged offense,
but permits conviction of a lesser included offense, e.g.,
second degree murder rather than first degree murder.

According to the legislative history, this provision was
intended, in part, "to eliminate the confusing spectacle of
cdriipetifigexpert Witnesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be
found by the trier of fact." S. Rep; No: 225, 98th Gong., 2d
Sess. 230, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News
3182,3412.
The underlying problem with such an opinion, however, is not that it embraces an "ultimate issue" but rather
that it is beyond the witness' expertise. Undoubtedly, a
psychiatrist or psychologist who has spent years diagnosing and treating mental disorders can provide a jury
with much helpful information about the origin and effects of a mental disorder. Nevertheless, insanity involves
a legal (moral), not a medical, issue, and therefore, no
matter how the test for insanity is phrased, a psychiatrist
or psychologist is no more qualified than any other person to give an opinion about whether a particular defendant's mental condition statisfies the legal test for insanity. See also ABA Standard 7-6.6 (1984).
For general references on the insanity defense, see W.
LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law§§ 36-38 (1972); R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 950-95 (3d ed. 1982); 2 P.
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses§ 173 (1984); Wilkinson & Roberts, Insanity Defense, 41 Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts2d 615 (1985). See also An not., 56 A.L.R.Fed. 326
(1982) (modern federal cases); Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 526
(1981) (modern state cases).

Many jurisdictrons recognlz'EHhis "mens rea" defense.
In some states statutory provisions govern the issue.
E.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.47.020 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. §
41-602 (1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat.§ 704-401 (1976); Idaho
Code§ 18-208 (1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 38
(1983); Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 552.030 (3) (Vernon Supp. 1986);
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-102 (1985); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:
4-2 (West 1982); Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-305 {1) (Supp.
1985). In other states, case law recognizes this defense.
E.g., Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 392-95 (Colo.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225 {1983); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 125, 3~4 A.2d 124, 130 {1978).
The scope of the mens rea defense, however, is not the
same in every jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, evidence on this issue is limited to "specific intent" crimes.
E.g., State v. Hines, 187 Conn. 199, 204, 445 A.2d 314,
317 (1982); State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Iowa
1977); State v. Dargatz, 228 Kan. 322, 332, 614 P.2d 430,
438 (1980); State v. Muir, 432 A.2d 1173, 1176 (R.I. 1981);
State v. Edmon, 28 Wash, App. 98, 102, 621 P.2d 1310,
1313 (1981). In other jurisdictions the defense is limited to
homicide cases. In homicide cases, psychiatric testimony is admissible on the issue of premeditation, the distinguishing element between first and second degree
murder. E.g., Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 695,
251 S.E.2d 202, 209, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979).

''DIMINISHED CAPACJTY''
Psychiatric and psychological testimony also may be
admissible to show that a defendant's mental condition,

A substantial number of courts, however, refuse to
recognize this defense and thus preclude the admissibili-
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cuse L. Rev. 1051 (1975); Morse, Diminished Capacity: A
Moral and Legal Conundrum, 21nt'l J.L. & Psychiatry 271
(1979). See also Annat., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).

ty of expert testimony on this issue. E.g., Bates v. State,
386 A.2d 1139, 1143-44 (Del. 1978); Bethea v. United
States, 365 A.2d 64, 92 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
911 (1977); Zeigler v. State, 402 So.2d 365, 373 (Fla.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1985); State v.
Edwards, 420 So.2d 663, 678 (La. 1982); Johnson v.
State, 292 Md. 405, 425-26, 439 A.2d 542, 554 (1982);
State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982);
State v. Wilcox, ?0 Ohio St.2d 182, 199, 436 N.E.2d 523,
533 (1982).
The new federal insanity statute appears to follow this
view; it provides that, except for insanity, "[m]ental disease or defect does not ... constitute a defense." 18
U.S.C.A. § 20(a) (West Supp. 1985). The First Circuit has
remarked: "(T]he recently enacted Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 ... abolished 'diminished capacity' as a defense." United States v. White, 766 F.2d
22, 25 (1st Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, a federal district
court has reached the opposite conclusion:

COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
In addition to insanity and the mens rea defense, psychiatric testimony is often admitted when a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial is an issue. Competency refers to a defendant's mental condition at the time
of trial and should be distinguished from insanity, which
refers to the defendant's mental condition at the time of
the offense. Moreover, the policy issues raised by the insanity defense differ substantially from those raised by
an accused's competency to stand trial. Insanity concerns a defendant's culpability for his criminal acts; it is a
substantive criminal law issue. In contrast, mental competency involves a due process issue. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his
due process right to a fair trial." Drape v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 172 (1975). See also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375, 378 (1966).
At least in terms of its impact on the criminal justice
system, mental competency is a far more important issue
than insanity:

[W]e find that § 20 represents an attempt by Congress to
define the circumstances in which an otherwise culpable
defendant will be excused for his or her conduct because of
mental disease or defect, and that the section has no effect
on the admissibility of evidence offered by a defendant to
negate the existence of specific intent and thereby show his
or her innocence. United States v. Frisbee,.38 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2284,2285 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 1985).

One survey ... shows that while as many as 52% of all offenders in mental institutions are there because of incompetence to stand trial, only 4% are committed as not guilty by
reason of insanity. One commentator has estimated that for
each defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, at
least a hundred defendants are determined to be incompetent to stand trial. ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 7-140 (1st Tent. Draft 1983).

Constitutional Issues
The exclusion of defense evidence that rebuts an element of an offense on which the prosecution has the burden of persuasion raises constitutional issues. As one
court has written: "The state bears the burden of proving
every element of the offense charged; defendant cannot
logically or constitutionally be denied the right to present
probative evidence rebutting an element of the crime
merely because such evidence also suggests insanity."
People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal.3d 318,321,583 P.2d 1308,
1310, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 267 (1978). See also Hendershott
v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 393-94 (Colo. 1982), cert. denied,
459 u.s. 1225 (1983).
This view, however has not been accepted by all
courts. For example, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that "a
state is not constitutionally compelled to recognize the
doctrine of diminished capacity and hence a state may
exclude expert testimony offered for the purpose of establishing that a criminal defendant lacked the capacity
to form a specific intent." Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124,
1144-45 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
Evidence of the defendant's mental condition that
neither negates mens rea nor amounts to insanity may
nevertheless be admissible in sentencing proceedings or
in the penalty stage of a capital case. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 921.141 (6) (b) & (f) (West 1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§
2929.04 (B) (3) (Page 1982). See also ABA Standard 7-9.3
(1984).
For a discussion of diminished capacity, see W. LaFave
& A. Scott, Criminal Law§ 42 (1972); R. Perkins & R.
Boyce, Criminal Law 980-85 (3d ed. 1982); 1 P. Robinson,
Criminal Law Defenses§ 64 (1984); Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses:
Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 Colum. L. Rev.
827 (1977); Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases
for Purposes Other Than the Defense of Insanity, 26 Syra-

Standard for Competency
In 1960 the Supreme Court set forth the following test
for determining an accused's competency to stand trial:
"[T]he test must be whether he has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding- and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960). While this test correctly indicates that competency is a legal, not a medical, issue, it nevertheless provides only a general definition of competency.
The ABA Mental Health Standards provide further
elaboration. First, according to the Standards, incompetency may arise from "mental illness, physical illness
or disability, mental retardation or other developmental
disability, or other etiology so long as it results in a defendant's inability to consult with defense counsel or to understand the proceedings." ABA Standard 7-4.1(c) (1984).
Second, the Standards take the position that competency should be addressed in "functional," rather than "diagnostic," terms. Under this approach five factors underlie the competency inquiry: (1) the defendant should have
a perception of the process which is not distorted by
mental illness or disability; (2) the defendant should have
the capacity to maintain the attorney-client relationship;
(3) the defendant should be able to recall and to relate
factual information; (4) the defendant should have the
ability to testify in his own defense, in the event that
should be appropriate; and (5) the defendant's abilities
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shpul<:l be aSS§)§.~~c:!LnJigbt of th~ severity of the charge
arid the"complexity of the case. ABA Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards 7-152 to -154 (1st Tent. Draft
1983}. S?~9?J1erc:liiY·Bennett,-A Guided Tour Through
Selected ABA Standards Relating to Incompetence to
Stand Tr-ial, 53Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 375 (1985}.
In s01ne.cases antipsychotic drugs enable otherwise
. unfit defendants to become competent. E.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Crowe, 391 F. Supp. 987, 989
(D.V.I.}, atf'd, 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975}; Ake v. State, 663
P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Grim. App. 1983}, rev'd on other grounds,
105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985}; Commonwealth v. Blair, 491 Pa.
499, 502;421A2d 656,657 (1980). One commentator
has argued thatdue process prohibits the use of such
drugs over a defendant's objection. Comment, Antipsychotic Drug§ f:J,nd fitness to Stand Trial: The Right of the
Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 773
(1985).

trial. Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975} ("Even
when a defendant is competent at the commencement of
his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to
stand trial."). Finally, the Court has held that a defendant
found to be incompetent may not be committed indefinitely to a mental facility without further proceedings:

Procedural Requirements
Frequently, the procedures governing an inquiry into a
defendant's competency to stand trial are specified by
statute. E.g., Ala. Code§ 15-16-21 (1982); Cal. Penal
Code §1367 (West 1982); N.M; Stat. Ann.§ 31-9-1 (1984);
Oliio Rev. Code Ann.§ 2945.37 (Page 1982); Wyo. Stat.§
7-11-302 (1977). See also 2 P. Robinson, Griminal Law Defenses 502 n.4 (1984) (listing statutes}. For example, the
federal statute authorizes the trial court to hold a competency hearing if there. is reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent.
18 U.S.C.A. § 4241{a) (West Supp. 1985). This procedure
may include a psychiatric or psychological examination.
1~!:1,$.~Q._f..~ .§__1_~'-1:1(l:>HV\fest Supp. 1985).
The procedures relating to competency determinations
must be read in light 9! C()J1_Stitytion_?l requirements. According to the Supreme Court, a hearing on competency
is mandated where the "evidence raises a 'bona fide
doubt' as to a defendant's competence to stand trial ...."
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). Moreover, the
Court has indicated that the trial court has a special responsibility to ensure that a defendant is competent at

Additional competency issues may arise when a defendant pleads guilty, waives counsel, or is sentenced.
ABA Standard 7-5.1-.3 {1984); Note, Competence to Plead
Guilty and to Stand Trial: A New Standard When a Criminal Defendant Waives Counsel, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1139
(1982).

[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is
committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the
State must either institute the customary civil commitment
proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any
other citizen, or release the defendant. Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).

For a discussion of competency, see W. LaFave & A.
Scott, Criminal Law§ 39 (1972}; 2· P. Robinson, Criminal
Law Defenses § 208 (1984); R. Roesch & S. Golding,
Competency to Stand Trial (1980); Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Mentally Retarded Defendant: The Need for a Multi-Disciplinary Solution to a
Multi-Disciplinary Problem, 17 Cal. W.L. Rev. 365 (1981};
Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev.
21 (1977}; Wilkinson & Roberts, Defendant's Competency
to Stand Trial, 40 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts2d 171 (1984);
Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 921 (1985); Roesch & Golding, Who Is
Competent to Stand Trial?, Trial 40 (Sept. 1985); Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454 {1967).
See also Model Penal Code§ 4.04; Annot., 63 A.L.R.Fed.
696 (1983); An not., 23 A.L.R.4th 493 (1983).

.....
;

I'

ji

'

I
I•

I

~-..

6

